While many hoped Israel and Hamas would sign a deal to release the abducted soldier Gilad Shalit from captivity, very few saw it coming. It was highly unlikely that the current Israeli government, virtually the most staunchly right-wing in the country’s history, would free hundreds of convicted terrorists in exchange for one soldier; especially the man at the helm, Benjamin Netanyahu, whose entire political career is premised on a firm refusal to negotiate with, let alone give in to terrorists.

The forced removal of Corporal Gilad Shalit from his base in south-western Israel by a Hamas squad, in June 2006, imposed on the Israeli society one of the most difficult dilemmas it ever had to deal with. Indeed, on several occasions over the past decade, Israel agreed to prisoner swaps, which were all, numerically at least, to its disadvantage: each included the release of hundreds of Palestinians and pro-Palestinian militants in exchange for a handful of Israeli soldiers. These, it should be noted, had been known or believed to be dead; Israel’s motivation was to give them a decent funeral, rather than bring them back to their families' midst.

Throughout Shalit’s years in captivity, however, Hamas released several audio- and videotapes from his makeshift detention facility in Gaza, confirming that he was alive and allegedly well (the latter could never be entirely confirmed due to Hamas’s persistent refusal to let a third party – most notably the International Red Cross – visit the prisoner, for fear it may reveal his whereabouts.) This introduced an unprecedented sense of urgency: could Israel afford to bide its time in the hope that Hamas rescind some of its demands, that were, for Israel, very hard to swallow? Every day that went by might have endangered the presumed good health of the abducted soldier, whose liberty was taken away while on duty, not to mention his deteriorating mental condition.

In refusing to bow to Hamas’s draconian demands, Israel took a risk that eventually paid off. After years of stalemate, Hamas backed down on some of its original demands. Though the number of prisoners slated for release remained almost unchanged, the Islamist movement compromised on their identity. In other words, the organisation’s top brass, who were responsible for the killing of hundreds of Israeli civilians during the terror campaign of the early 2000s, will remain in Israeli prison. Hamas also accepted the Israeli demand that the majority of the freed prisoners would be deported to the hermetically-sealed Gaza Strip, and not be allowed to return to their homes in the West Bank, where they might breathe new life into the impaired militant cells that Israel, together with the Palestinian Authority, has worked day and night – quite successfully – to thwart.

The release of hundreds of prisoners – which the average Palestinian sees as freedom fighters unjustly punished for their resistance to the Israeli occupation – would most likely boost Hamas’s standing in the Palestinian public opinion. But the group’s desperate desire for an immediate PR gain only attests to the sorry state they currently are in. The events of the Arab spring have made them realise that even Arab populations will not put up with totalitarian and oppressive regimes forever, and that they might be next. On the same note, they have been witnessing the end of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Hamas’s main international sponsor, fast approaching. And finally, on the domestic front, they saw their arch-rival, President Mahmoud Abbas, stealing the show last month when he submitted a statehood bid to the UN, a bold move that won him high praise among his people. For all these reasons, Hamas felt the urgency to become relevant again, even at the price of making some concessions.

These developments were beyond Israeli government’s reach and influence, but it did well to seize the opportunity and strike a deal that may not be ideal, but is probably the best it can get. Netanyahu, as well as his cabinet, should therefore be commended for not letting their ideology interfere with their pragmatism – for a change.

Gilad Halpern

Paris